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The quest for an international ocean regime came with the discovery of the common heritage of mankind. Science had laid bare
the hidden environment of the deep oceans and seabeds; technology had put their riches at man's reach. But the wealth of the
oceans was beyond the limits of national sovereignty, beyond the
limits of the classical concept of ownership. There was no law, national or international, to regulate their uses, because technical
advances had made the old law of the sea obsolete. So either nations would go out there for a "grab," and, in the process, they
would destroy one another and the oceans as well, or they would
get together to make a new law, based on the concept that this was
their common property and that it must be managed for the common good of all peoples.
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It was a generous, positive, and optimistic concept: a forecast of
boom. It was an approach apt to change the relations between
the rich and poor, big and small nations, and to offer a new way
of dealing with the basic problems of development. It signalled a
revolution in international relations, which must be an integral
part of the social, political, economic, scientific, and technological
revolutions of our age.
While minor prophets of boom were still squabbling, not so
much on the question of whether, indeed, this was the situation
which nobody, really, could deny or challenge, but whether the
economic and political consequences of the "marine revolution"
would mature in five, ten or fifteen years (as though this
really made a difference!)-the prophets of doom took over: announcing the end of the oceans, and of life on earth, consequent
on man's sinful pollution of the environment.
The prophets of boom and of doom had one thing in common:
they were both universalists who saw salvation only in international cooperation. They both were true believers in the common
heritage of mankind, even though their emphasis was different.
The Doomists stressed renunciation: what not to do. The Boomists wanted action: what to do. The Doomists were mostly
"Haves;" the Boomists were "Have-nots."
Since both schools of thought were universalists, however, they
could have gotten along. Man can live with God and Satan, after
all, and it was clear that it was necessary to conserve in order to
develop and to develop in order to conserve.
In the meantime, however, a third school of thought was getting
ready to take over: the prophets of Gloom. Man's foremost quality is greed, they said. It always has been, and it always will be.
Nations will not yield an inch: they will take all they can getas far as their technologies will reach, and think of today rather
than of tomorrow. An extension of national jurisdiction over
two hundred miles will give Lebenstraum to modern technologies
for another decade or two and at that time man can think up
another solution. Perfection is not of this world. There will always
be some pollution, even though it need not be of an apocalyptic nature; there will always be some wealth from the oceans, although
it need not be for all. The "common heritage" is what you leave to
God after having taken for Caesar.
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is going
toward a grand Concilium attempting to accommodate Gloomists,
Doomists, and Boomists in one Church. Will it be possible? Will
there be schisms?
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The Gloomists start from a vantage point. The extension of national jurisdiction over resources, over an area including practically everything that is economically profitable, will be the starting point of the negotiations. The "Economic Zone" or "patrimonial sea," out to a two-hundred mile limit, must be taken for
granted. In return, there will be a restriction of the territorial
sea, over which full national sovereignty is exercised, to twelve
miles; and there will be free transit (not "innocent") through
straits and throughout the economic zone, to the limit of the territorial sea. What happens to the limits of national jurisdiction
of small islands, artificial islands and archipelagoes remains to
be seen. What happens to scientific research in the economic
zone, beyond the limits of the territorial sea, remains to be seen.
While progress has been made regarding waste dumping from
ships, not much agreement has been reached, as yet, in what concerns the international ocean institutions which are to govern the
seabed or ocean space beyond the limits of the economic zone. If
there is a worldwide agreement on the economic zone, the consequences are complex and not yet fully explored.
As is well known, the idea of extending national jurisdiction
over ocean areas which, until then, had been no-man's land, goes
back to the Truman Proclamation' of 1945. In an essay 2 written
for Pacem in Maribus three years ago but looking well ahead of
its time, Bertrand de Jouvenel analyzed the reasons that induced
what was then the world's greatest marine power, the U.S.A., to
deal such an unorthodox blow to the hoary doctrine of the freedom of the seas which, since the days of Grotius and Selden, had
always been the doctrine of the strong. De Jouvenel reminds us
that the Truman Proclamation was an internal, not an external
act, in the first place. It determined relations between states and
federal jurisdictions (and economic interests), not between federal
It
and international jurisdictions (and economic interests).
should also be remembered that the oil industry kicked and
and screamed against the Truman Proclamation. They called it
1. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with respect to

the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental
Shelf, Sept. 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
2. DeJouvenal, An Economic View of Marine Problems, in THE TIDES OF
CHANGE, PEACE, POLLUTION AND POTENTIAL OF THE OCEANS (E. Borgese and

D. Krieger, eds., forthcoming 1974).

creeping Communism, foreshadowing "the end of the oil industry
as we know it." This, again was in view of its internal, not its external implications.
As for the external implications which came to the fore somewhat later, de Jouvenel points out that they served American economic interests in a dubious way. For the only companies which
could in fact have exploited the outer continental shelf were
American or American dominated. So who would have contested
or challenged American exploration and exploitation of the American Continental shelf? The fact is that by gaining what nobody
contested anyway, while losing the rest of the world's 5,753,400
square nautical miles of continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters,
they conceivably lost far more than they gained-as was pointed
out, at that time, by Senator Pell, 3 by Professor Wolfgang Friedmann, 4 and others.
It would seem logical, then, and in line with history, that the
poor nations should gain more than the rich by an extention of
"sovereignty" into the seas. Hence, a rush of expansionist claims:
Argentina's in 1946;l Chile's in 1947;6 Peru's in 1947; 7 and the
Declaration of Santiago in 1952-all claiming not only the ocean
floor but the superjacent waters, or "epicontinental sea" as well,
out to a limit of 200 miles.
The Truman Proclamation was universalized in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, now ratified by forty-nine nations, both rich and poor. On the part of the developing nations,
this was followed by the Declaration of Santo Domingo, in 1972,
proposing the creation of the "Patrimonial Sea," and the Yaounde
Declaration, advocating the "economic zone" of 200 miles. Undoubtedly this is the shape of things to come at the UNCLOS.
It should be noted that, from the beginning, the developed nations
concentrated on the ocean floor, the developing nations claimed
the floor and the superjacent waters. This, again, is logical.
For it is only the rich nations who have the technologies for ocean
3. Pell, Assessment of the Political Dimensions of an Ocean Regime,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS Or THE OcEAN REGIME, at 205-18 (1971).

4. Friedman, Selden Redivivus-Toward a Partitionof the Seas?, 65 Am.
J. INT'L. L. 757-70 (1971).
5. Decree No. 14,708 October 11, 1946, in Boletin Official, Dec. 5, 1946.
6. President Declaration of June 23, 1947, U.N.L.S., Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 723 (ST/Leg/Ser/B6, 1956).
7. Supreme Decree No. 781 of August 1, 1947 in El Peruano, Diaro
Oficial, August 11, 1947.
8. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, Signed at the First
Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago, 18 Aug. 1952.
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mining. As far as fishing is concerned, they dispose of far-ranging
fishing fleets profiting from a maximum of freedom of the seas.
The poor nations are at least as much interested in fishing as in
mining. They do not dispose of far-ranging fishing fleets, and it
is logical that they should want to reserve fish stocks in the waters adjacent to their coasts for their own use and to protect
them against the predatory inroads of the technologically strong
nations.
Whether practically the acquisition of the economic zone as
such will be as beneficial to the poor nations as is now assumed,
remains to be seen.
When the oil companies realized that the external implications of
the Truman Proclamation were far more important than the internal ones, they had a change of heart. They warmly embraced
the continental shelf doctrine. In policy statement after policy
statement,9 the American Petroleum Council counseled extension of
national jurisdiction out to the edge of the continental margin, including the rise, if possible, containing everything that could conceivably be exploited for several decades to come. As far as foreign continental shelves were concerned, the big companies were
convinced that they could cope with foreign countries on the seabed as they did on land. To negotiate royalties or joint ventures
with individual sheiks seemed a far safer, more familiar, and more
profitable procedure for the powerful companies, than to deal with
a strong international organization.
Should not this make the poor nations suspicious?
True there is OPEC now, and trouble for the developed nations.
But this may turn out to be a fleeting triumph, not necessarily
conducive to development. There will be some more money for a
few already over-moneyed poor nations-money that goes into
golden Rolls Royces and Swiss bank accounts; money that makes
the money market go haywire without visible benefit to the majority of poor nations. As far as the rich nations are concerned, there
will be serious trouble and dislocations, perhaps paralysis. But
they will concentrate their efforts on developing alternative energy resources and technologies, far more powerful than oil, and
inexhaustible, which, again, they will monopolize, thus further
9. See, e.g., Statement of Policy-American Petroleum Institute, in
at 11-12 (center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, E. Burnell and P. Von Simson, Eds. 1970).
PACEM IN MAMlIJus, OCEAN ENTERPRISES

deepening the development gap. All this furthermore, will 1rofoundly alter the perception of national interests in the continental shelf, as documented by Lewis Alexander in a paper for Pacem
in MaribusIV.10 But this is in the future.
For the present, industrial and commercial interests, the most
exploitative interests within the rich countries, happily accept
the extension of national jurisdiction in the oceans-they can live
with it.
And the poor nations should be suspicious.
What is true for oil is beginning to be true for the fishing industry as well. The big fishmeal producing companies and conglomerates are sending their managers happily from one developing nation to another-in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, West Africa, all
over-to develop new fisheries. These men are not in the least
concerned about the extension of national jurisdiction. Where
there are no fishes, it makes no difference anyway; where there are
fishes, the poor coastal nations often are not even in a position to
know where the fish are; they can be spotted from high-flying
planes or satellites-primitive methods can in no way exploit the
"sustainable yield." Developing nations need the big companies.
Joint ventures provide a perfectly acceptable instrument to get the
job done; especially if they are accompanied by international
guarantees for the security of investments, thus strengthening the
status quo; and additionally if they leave top management, and the
majority of shares, in the hands of the foreign company, thus making sure the company will gets its fair share.
Yugoslavia has a long and extensive experience with joint ventures. The developing nations should take a careful look at this
experience. The lesson is: if the domestic enterprise is no match,
technologically and/or financially, for the foreign company or
multinational, the deal will work out altogether in favor of the
latter. It will still be a case of post-colonial extraction economy,
pure and simple. If, on the other hand, the domestic enterprise is
strong, the enthusiasm of the foreign company is quick to wane.
Pacem in Maribus recently commissioned some research on the
impact of the extension of national jurisdiction on the GNP of
coastal nations. The research was done by Professor H. Gary
Knight of Louisiana State University.
The results are far from reassuring. A comparison between fisheries revenues for the ten nations with the highest GNP, the ten
developing nations with the highest GNP and a fishing zone not
10. Alexander, National Interests in the Continental Shelf, in PROCEEDIV, at 312-32 (D. Krieger, ed., forthcoming 1974).

INGS OF PACEM IN MARIuUS
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exceeding twelve miles, and ten developing nations with a fishing
zone of over 100 miles, lead him to the conclusion that "clearly,
revenue is a function of economic development, not the quantity
of ocean space jurisdiction claimed."'1
All this is not to say that the concept of the economic zone
should be abandoned. Politically and historically such a goal
would be unobtainable. The economic zone or patrimonial sea is
with us. If it has no developmental value, nonetheless, it does
have a certain defensive value. It also has a bargainingvalue, in
the hands of the weaker nations, and they should make the most
of that.
The intention of this analysis merely is to show that, while it is
a bargaining asset, the economic zone is no solution to the problems
set out to be solved with the Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The oceans still are an ecological whole. The rational management
of ocean space and resources still requires international action.
The development gap still is upon us. The creation of international
institutions capable of rational management of the common heritage of mankind and apt to reduce the development gap remains the
great challenge. This, still, implies a revolution in international
relations.
But the acceptance of the economic zone forces us to rethink
our concept of the international ocean regime. Four immediate basic consequences come to mind, two of them negative, two positive, with a number of practical corollaries.
First, the establishment of the economic zone drastically reduces
the economic viability of the international regime. For all practical purposes, it removes oil from international management. Oil
royalties will continue to accrue to nations, not to the international community. International community royalties would have
meant redistribution of income; sharing, by the poorer nations, in
the common heritage of mankind; cooperation, instead of confrontation, in the energy crisis. Nation-state royalties mean money will
continue to go where money is.
The same is true for the bulk of income created by fisheries, since
most of the fish, about 85 per cent, are within the limits of the
economic zone.
11. Knight, Impacts of Some Law of the Sea Proposals on Gulf and
Caribbean Ocean Resource Development, CARmBEAN STUDY PROJECT WoRKiNG PAPERS, IwTERNATIONAL OCEAN INSTITE

at 366-413 (1973).

The only wealth created in the area beyond the limits of the
economic zone will be that of the manganese nodules. Income accruing to the international community from these nodules has been
estimated as approximately $6,000,000 annually by Dr. Frank LaQue. This is not peanuts, but certainly it is not enough to close the
development gap, even if it were to be administered equitably, from
a world community point of view, which will not be the case.
It is more than likely that, as the mineralogical implications of
the latest marine-geological concepts become clearer, new and vast
mineral resources will become economically exploitable on the
deep ocean floor, especially on the slopes of the mid-Oceanic
ridges. But that is for the future.
The second basic consequence follows from the first. To the extent that the international regime is bereft of its real and immediate economic potential, interest in international institution building is bound to wane. The developing nations will be so occupied
with the prospect of acquiring an economic zone that they will
scarcely be willing to look beyond. Their technological range does
not reach that far. They will have their hands full developing
what they have now under their own jurisdiction. Here, again,
they will gently comply with the wishes and interests of Big
Business in the rich countries. For, as is well known, neither
the companies, nor the rich developed nations want strong, operational, international institutions. This consequence, again, is unfortunate for the developing nations. For without strong, operational, international institutions, the rich will continue to dominate.
In the absence of strong, operational, international institutions,
transnational functions like pollution controls and a minimum of
maritime traffic regulation would be left to enlarged, specialized
agencies.
And thus the danger is that we will end up with a patchwork
of inflated contending national jurisdictions and overlapping functional international competences. This is not the way to run an
ocean, or anything else. The first casualty would be the common
heritage of mankind-mentioned far less frequently these days in
the literature and public speeches. The heaviest loss would be to
the developing nations.
Alternately, consider the positive implications of the Economic
Zone.
The extension of national jurisdiction over the ocean floor, with
the single purpose of assuring mining rights, was a claim put forward primarily by the rich nations (and companies). The exten-
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sion of national jurisdiction over the superjacent waters-the economic zone-has been the counterclaim of the developing nations. The economic zone is a multi-purpose zone, calling for the
systemic management of national ocean space and resources. This
is an important difference. It is even more important if, as a consequence, ocean space beyond the limits of the economic zone, must
now be considered as a multi-purpose zone whose multiple uses
call for systemic management. In other words, the establishment of
a multi-purpose economic zone, comprising seabed and superjacent
waters, dooms the notion of an international seabed authority to irretrievable obsolescence. To "knit" with the national economic
zone, international ocean-space institutions are needed.
This, it seems, is very strongly in favor of the developing nations,
and they should recognize the consequence and move from their past
advocacy of a strong, operational, international seabed authority,
now obsolete, forward to the advocacy of a strong, operational
ocean-space authority as the logical complement to their national
ocean-space management systems.
A single-purpose regime, regulating (rather than managing) a
technology, such as nodule mining, in which only the most developed nations are competent, would quite inevitably work out in favor of these few nations. It simply would not be realistic; it would
be anti-economic and anti-historical to expect otherwise. Such a
regime would practically be a cartel of a few big companies from a
very few nations, to run the nodule business. This is the technological reality, and no one can change it by extracting an insignificant
royalty. And what else could be done?
If, instead, the ocean institutions deal with the multiple uses of
ocean space, then there is elbow room for the rest of the world to
come in and participate. When old and new uses of the seas, and
a variety of technologies, skills, rights, and traditions are involved,
then there is the possibility of bargaining, of giving and taking;
then the real interests, and the opportunities of the developing
nations are far greater. And to call for comprehensive oceanspace
institutions rather than for a single-purpose seabed authority is the
logical consequence of the economic zone concept as against the
continental shelf doctrine.
Fourth, the economic zone forces consideration of the international ocean regime in functional rather than in territorialterms.

Ocean affairs, from the beginning, have occupied a curious place
at the crossroads of territorial and functional thinking. Ocean
space beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is a territorial concept. The management of the uses of ocean space, or of ocean resources, is a functional concept. International ocean space is territorially delimited by the boundaries of national jurisdiction. The
international management of ocean resources is not so delimited.
Resources, in fact, can be managed internationally even if there is
no territorial space beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The
European Economic Communities set a historical precedent.
As long as the limits of national jurisdiction were at three, six,
or even twelve miles off shore, the territorial and the functional
concept of an ocean regime coincided, i.e., regulating the noman's land of the seas, one could regulate its uses. The establishment of an economic zone makes the territorial concept of the
ocean regime obsolete since the "territory" beyond the limits of the
economic zone has strongly reduced functions. A territorial regime unable to regulate the functional uses of the oceans would be
meaningless.
The mistake lies in considering the international community as
a little island in the middle of the oceans, whose interests decrease
as one moves toward the coasts. The international community is the nations and peoples of the world, and its sphere of interests is worldwide. The establishment of the economic zone makes
this concept mandatory. If we want a rational management of the
oceans, we must, by treaty commonly agreed upon, regulate the
uses nations (and companies) make of ocean space which is an
ecological whole, just as the Europeans regulate agriculture, transport, or the migration of labor in Europe, across boundaries, beyond
the functional (not territorial) limits of national jurisdiction.
Such a concept would leave the defensive function of the economic zone intact; the economic zone of developing nations would
be impermeable to penetration and exploitation by other technologically superior nations. On the other hand, it would not foreclose the developmental opportunities that accrue from strong,
operational international ocean institutions. The economic zone
should be permeable to international cooperation and management
in which the developing nations have a decisive share in decision
making.
What, then, should be the advantages the developing nations
hope to obtain from the Law of the Sea Conference? What
is their bargaining position? What is the quid pro quo they can
exact from industrialized nations, once the establishment of the
economic zone is an established fact?
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Above all, they should press for institutions that are not only
comprehensivebut operationalas well.
At present, the only government that has proposed comprehensive, multi-purpose ocean space institutions, as against a singlepurpose seabed authority, is Malta (which, at this point, is not
pressing very hard for the adoption of its own scheme). It would
be extremely worthwhile for the other developing nations to take
up the scheme and modify it as desirable.
The reasons developing nations have been hesitant to take the
step from a single-purpose seabed authority to a multi-purpose
comprehensive ocean regime are, generally speaking, of two kinds.
Let us not reach for the moon and come back empty-handed, they
have said. A comprehensive system is too complex, it cannot be
realized all at once; so let us be practical and take one step at a
time. A seabed authority can be established now; comprehensive
ocean-space institutions, not yet. The second, and perhaps more
generic reason is that they have done their "home work" with regard to the seabed authority. Their drafts are completed; they are
ready to negotiate. They have not done this kind of work with regard to ocean space as a whole. They do not have the manpower
to prepare comprehensive alternatives prior to the Law of the Sea
Conference scheduled to begin this summer.
The fact, however, is that no matter what, the Law of the Sea
Conference is going to be comprehensive. As is well known, there
is a "competence gap" between the mandate of the Seabed Committee, whose terms of reference were limited to the seabed, and the
mandate of the Law of the Sea Conference, which is to deal with
ocean affairs in the broadest sense. This competence gap may
have very serious consequences; the danger is that ocean affairs in
the broader sense will be dealt with piece-meal, in an uncoordinated and unsystematic way, causing loop-holes and overlaps, rather
than in a systematic and coherent way. The piece-meal and unsystematic approach, however, costs at least as much, if not considerably more, work and preparation as the systematic and coherent
approach. It is a question of concept, not of work.
As to the argument that not everything can be done at once and
that one must start somewhere, this is undoubtedly correct. But
again, it is one thing to start haphazardly, to take a step which
may have to be taken back before taking the next; and it is quite

another thing to have a comprehensive scheme with a timetable
attached to it, internationalizing a series of functions over a number of years, just as was, and still is being done by the European
Economic Communities.
Having laid down one comprehensive scheme, one might then
envision that deep-sea nodule mining, for instance, should come
under international control immediately-not because it happens
to take place "beyond the limits of the economic zone," but because it represents the newest use of the oceans and therefore is
perhaps most amenable to a new type of international approach.
Oil and other energy production, shipping, and fisheries might
come in successive stages. Each successive step represents a widening of the concept of the common heritage of mankind, with
the legal implications of non-appropriability and participation in
management as well as in the profits derived therefrom.
But the comprehensive scheme must be there, otherwise the first
step is bound to go in the wrong direction i.e., it will not be beneficial for the developing nations, which will be practically left out.
To be operational, the regime must provide for an "enterprise"
or "enterprises" under the control of the political ocean-space institutions. Such enterprises provide the only realistic opportunity
for the developing nations to enter as active partners into the production process. The "enterprise" is essential if one wants to realize an active concept of the common heritage, as implying not only
passive sharing of financial benefits, but sharing in decision-making and management, and an acceleration in the transfer of technologies and skills.
The Seabed Draft Treaties of all the developing nations contain,
in fact, provisions, albeit too sketchy, for the establishment of such
an "enterprise." In the new, enlarged context, this should not be
abandoned. It should be adapted and expanded.
Here again, it would not be practical to have a whole series
of international, public/private enterprises established at once.
It will take time. But the institutional framework can be created
immediately, and there must be a time schedule.
In return for the concession of the "economic zone," the Great
Powers ask for certain guarantees: the freedom of navigation
beyond the limits of the territorial sea and free transit through
straits; the freedom of scientific research, to a twelve-mile limit at
least; and security of investments for the exploitation of the economic zone.
These requests, however, should not be considered as the price
to be paid by the developing nations for the acquisition of the eco-

[voL. 11: 541, 1974]

Conference on the Law of the Sea
SAN DIEGO LAW REIEW

nomic zone. There is no price due. Actually, the economic zone is
the price the rich nations are paying for the Truman Doctrine.
It is they who started the escalation of territorial expansion into
the sea. So, any other point ought to be considered on its own
merits.
Freedom of navigation and of transit through straits clearly is
more interesting to the great sea powers than to developing nations. Hence the developing nations have it in their power to exact a price: a price, the payment of which is apt to strengthen the
kind of comprehensive and operational ocean regime that is beneficial to developing nations. A fair price to be paid for freedom
of navigation and transit through straits is the internationalization of tracking devices and monitoring systems, from seabed installations to buoys and satellites.
In a paper commissioned by Pacem in Maribus, Professor Thomas Mathews documented how the most sensitive areas of the oceans
today are "bugged" by the great powers. His example is the Caribbean Sea, which has fallen under the complete surveillance of the
United States, with little awareness on the part of those being
watched.
The silent satellite as it passes five hundred miles ovehead bothers
few except those who are conscious of its existence. There is
little occurring on the surface of, for example, Cuba, which is
overlooked by the cameras....
Underseas, there is a surveillance system known as SOSUS,
which can detect and locate any submarine penetration of the
Caribbean. With naval and air reconnaissance units, and satellite
surveillance, the military has the Caribbean sewn up fairly tight.
The implications of such a complete system of surveillance over
an area in which there are twenty five million people, six sovereign states, and international waters and airways utilized by all
nationalities should 12give rise to concern on the part of the citizenry of the region.

The situation is not much different in other sensitive ocean
areas. What is more, the installation of such surveillance systems
is perfectly legitimate under the existing law of the seas. One
should also add that it is essential for a sea power to know about
all movements on and under the sea, within the range of its own
12. Mathews, An Historical View of the Geo-Political Aspects of the

Lines of Communication Through the Caribbean Sea,

PRoJEcT, supra note 11 at 136-69.
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operations which, of course, may be world wide. Nations which
cannot afford such surveillance systems obviously are disadvantaged.
If the intent of the information thus gathered is defensive, however, i.e., really aimed at security, it might as well be sharedwhich also would make it far cheaper and more complete. Only
if it is to be offensive, i.e., aimed at insuring the supremacy and
domination of any one nation in the oceans, does it make sense to
keep it secret under national monopoly. The new law of the
sea should be aiming at the maximum possible reduction of national domination in the seas. The internationalization of tracking devices and surveillance systems would be a step in this direction.
Add to this that, to be economical, tracking and monitoring systems should be multi-purpose systems. That is, in many cases
the same installations, platforms, buoys, and satellites used to track
military movements can be used to monitor pollution, locate schools
of fish, or for other peaceful purposes. Insofar as they are serving such peaceful purposes, these systems should be internationalized anyway under the new law of the sea. The convergence of
pollution control policies and arms control policies, or the armscontrolling effects of pollution control measures in the oceans is a
matter of growing importance, bound to affect the very structure
of ocean-space institutions. In a recent paper, Elizabeth Young
wrote:
The activities of the various existing and planned United Nations
bodies and of an ocean regime's own organization are bound to
result in a considerable international presence in ocean space...
This presence, of itself, would have an arms control effect, proportionate to its scale and to the range of its activities, and at
some point it will be necessary to consider how this effect can
be enlarged and enhanced...
Any inspectorate, research exercise, monitority body, is part of a de facto international verification system. In setting them up arms control significance of the
information they are to acquire should be kept in view and eventually concerted.13

The internationalization of tracking devices and surveillance systems can be accomplished at once. It is a fair price for the freedom of transit.
Freedom of scientific research, theoretically, is of equal interest
to all people and all nations. Science is the common heritage of
mankind par excellence, and it should be managed by all nations
cooperatively and for the benefit of all. Science in the oceans, fur13. Young, Arms Control in the Ocean, Active and Passive, Tmn TrES
OF CHANGS, supra note 2.
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thermore, is at the vanguard of all sciences in two ways: first, the
new understanding of marine geology is revolutionizing our understanding of the geology and history of the earth as a whole; and,
second, the very nature of ocean research makes it mandatory, due
to the very nature of the world ocean itself, that this research be
carried out internationally. The nation that opts out of this science
in fact opts out of modern civilization, and opts out of development.
This, however, is theory. Practically, there can be no doubt that
the industrialized nations have a far greater immediate return
from unrestrained scientific research in the oceans than the developing nations, who are not equipped to participate in, and often,
even to evaluate the results of the research. There can be no
doubt that in the developed nations scientific research is inextricably linked with both industrial and military interests, and the line
between "pure" and "basic" research, commercially valuable exploration, and military reconnoitering is impossible to draw. Publication of the results is not an adequate answer, if what is "published"
is in fact undecipherable to the developing nations along whose
coasts such research is carried out. The case of the developing
nations who want to control and restrict such research thus is as
ironclad as the case of the developed nations demanding freedom
of research.
Here again, the developing nations could use their leverage to
advance the kind of comprehensive and operational ocean-space institutions they need. Instead of restricting scientific research off
their coasts, which retards their own development, they should
demand the internationalizationof research by means of the establishment of a "scientific enterprise," i.e., an international ocean research institute, in whose management and policy-making they participate and which would be under the control of the governing
organs of the international ocean regime. Such an institute would
guarantee that ocean research is "pure." It would interpret data.
It would serve as a training center for scientists from the developing nations; and it would accelerate the transfer of knowledge and
technologies. Only science channeled through the International
Ocean Institute should be "free" and unrestricted. Developing nations would be quite justified in keeping their defences up against
national research not so channeled.
We have tried to plant the seed for such an institute with the
establishment, under UNDP auspices, of the International Ocean In-

stitute in Malta. It is a very modest beginning. It would be to
the best interests of the developing nations, and of ocean science
in general, to make of such an institute, greatly enlarged, a constituent part of the international ocean regime.
1nternational guarantees for the security of investments, again
is a one-sided demand serving only the rich. Where changes in
social, political, and economic infrastructures are needed for development, such guarantees may in fact serve to reinforce the status
quo and to forestall change. The extension of jurisdiction over resource-rich economic zones will increase the dependence of poor
nations on rich companies and joint ventures. Confrontation between organizations limited to resource-owning developing nations
(of the OPEC type) and resource-importing industrialized nations
will not solve the problem in the long run-if only because resource-poor developing nations are left out of the bargain. In the
case of petroleum, for instance, it is already clear that it is this
third group of nations who suffers most from the cost increase resulting from this confrontation. The only solution would seem
to subject disputes to regulation by the international ocean authority. Multinationals should be chartered internationally, and
standards for the international operations of companies ought to be
laid down by the appropriate bodies of the ocean regime, bearing in
mind the needs of all countries.
The price for international guarantees for the security of investments should be the international regulation of the companies.
It is also likely that the competition coming from a public/private
international "Enterprise" along the lines of the Latin-American
proposal would serve to raise standards of international cooperation
for the benefit of the developing nations.
It is hoped that this "shopping list" of quae pro quibus might
contribute to the building of a platform for the meeting of Boom,
Doom, and Gloom over the oceans, and to the reconciliation of
the needs of development, the preoccupations with environmental
constraints, and the national interests of all parties concerned.

